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LABOR COSTS AND THE SOCIAL DUMPING DEBATE 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
CHRISTOPHER L. ERICKSON and SAROSH KURUVILLA* 
This study examines the labor cost incentive for capital movement in 
manufacturing within the European Union, a key aspect of the "social 
dumping" debate in Western Europe. The authors find that the percent- 
age differences in unit labor costs between the more developed and less 
developed countries in the Union not only were large in 1980 but 
actually grew between 1980 and 1986, and separate estimates of compen- 
sation and productivity growth rates do not indicate that significant 
convergence occurred over the remainder of the 1980s. Although these 
findings apparently confirm that a labor cost incentive for capital 
mobility does exist, analysis of foreign direct investment data indicates 
that during the period 1980-88 capital flows to the lower labor cost 
countries actually were not much larger than capital flows to the higher 
labor cost countries. 
The recent debate over the North Ameri- 
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
in North America parallels the debate that 
has gone on for some years in the European 
Union (previously known as the European 
Community) over the common market. In 
both cases, many workers and employers in 
the high-wage country (or countries) fear 
that they will lose jobs and business as a 
result of "free trade" with a country in 
which labor costs and labor standards are 
much lower, whereas supporters of free 
trade argue that the costs will be minimal, 
can be met by one safety net or another, 
and in any event will be significantly out- 
weighed by the benefits to consumers of a 
single or common market. The term "so- 
cial dumping" has been used to denote the 
outcomes disadvantageous to labor that 
many argue could result from the opera- 
tion of the single market under circum- 
stances of wide differences in labor stan- 
dards and costs. This paper examines one 
key aspect of the social dumping debate: 
the incentives for capital to move from 
high labor cost countries to countries with 
low labor costs. 
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The fear that capital flight from higher- 
cost countries to lower-cost countries would 
result in a general depression of labor stan- 
dards and protections throughout the 
Union led to the adoption of the Social 
Charter by eleven of the twelve European 
Union (EU) countries (Britain dissenting) 
in December 1989. The Social Charter 
aims to counteract social dumping via long- 
term "upward harmonization" of labor stan- 
dards and social policies. 
The Social Charter tends to focus, how- 
ever, on the differences in labor standards 
among member countries irrespective of 
differences in productivity. Yet, inter-coun- 
try differences in unit labor costs, or worker 
compensation per unit of output, are more 
relevant to the capital mobility aspect of 
the social dumping debate. Labor costs can 
be a key component of competitive strat- 
egy, and it seems doubtful that harmoniza- 
tion policies will be able to equalize the 
currently large differences in manufactur- 
ing labor costs across the EU countries. In 
the context of the importance attached to 
labor standards and social protection, the 
relative lack of attention to labor costs is 
surprising. 
Everyone acknowledges that there are 
indeed significant differences among EU 
countries in wages and fringe benefits. In 
1992, for example, hourly compensation 
costs for workers in manufacturing ranged 
in U.S. dollars from $25.94 in Germany to 
$5.01 in Portugal. Yet, Flanagan (1993) has 
shown that despite the removal of barriers 
to intra-Union labor mobility over the 
course of the 1960s, migration within the 
Union increased very little during the pe- 
riod 1957-89, and the level of wage disper- 
sion in manufacturing and construction 
among the original six EU countries in 
1989 was only slightly below the level in 
1957. 
Flanagan's study of wage differentials 
looked at labor mobility rather than capital 
mobility. Supporters of unfettered free 
trade, however, argue that wage compari- 
sons can produce misleading projections 
of capital mobility, because higher produc- 
tivity in the high-wage countries may offset 
most or all of the wage difference-and 
thus free trade will offer little if any incen- 
tive for capital flight. To date, however, no 
study has empirically evaluated that claim 
for the EU. 
The best labor cost predictor of capital 
mobility is unit labor costs, because this is 
the measure that is relevant for employer 
profit maximization. This study estimates 
differentials in unit labor costs in manufac- 
turing within the EU in the most recent 
year for which all the data are available 
(1986); we also examine whether these dif- 
ferentials remained stable over the 1980s. 
We also briefly explore, through an analysis 
of data that are at best only suggestive, the 
extent to which capital was already flowing 
during the 1980s toward the EU countries 
in which unit labor costs are the lowest. 
Social Dumping and the Social Charter 
As Mosely (1990:160) explained, 
Social dumping could take place in at least 
three different ways: (a) through the displace- 
ment of high-cost producers by low-cost pro- 
ducers from countries in which wages, social 
benefits, and direct and indirect costs entailed 
by protective legislation are markedly lower; 
(b) firms in high labor cost countries would be 
increasingly free to relocate their operations, 
thereby strengthening their bargaining power 
vis-A-vis their current work force to exert down- 
ward pressure on wages and working condi- 
tions; and (c) individual states might be tempted 
to pursue a low wage and perhaps anti-union 
labor market strategy as part of their efforts to 
catch up economically.' 
The general expectation is that the first two 
types of mechanisms (that is, displacement 
or movement from high-cost to low-cost 
countries, or the use of the threat of such 
'The term "social dumping" is also sometimes 
used to refer to the movement of workers from low- 
wage countries to high-wage countries. For example, 
Streeck (1991) discussed the possibility of immigra- 
tion of unskilled workers to Germany with the elimi- 
nation of barriers on the free movement of people 
within the EU. As previously noted, however, Flanagan 
(1993) found that migration within the EU failed to 
respond to the reduction of legal barriers to migra- 
tion since the 1957 Treaty of Rome, even though the 
wage incentive for out-migration from the low-wage 
countries was higher in 1988 than in the early 1960s. 
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movement as a means of lowering costs in 
high-cost countries) are the most probable 
means by which social dumping will occur 
in the EU. 
Such fears led to support for the intro- 
duction of a Social Charter, which has been 
the subject of intense debate.2 Such a char- 
ter was first explicitly proposed by Jacques 
Delors, president of the European Com- 
mission, in May 1988. In December 1989, 
the final version of the Social Charter, a 
substantially diluted version of earlier drafts, 
was accepted in principle by 11 of the 12 EU 
countries, with Britain dissenting. Briefly, 
the Charter is aimed at harmonizing labor 
protection and social policies across mem- 
ber states via proposals regarding freedom 
of movement; employment and (minimum) 
remuneration; improvements of living and 
working conditions; social protection; free- 
dom of association and collective bargain- 
ing; vocational training; equal treatment 
for men and women; information, consul- 
tation, and participation of employees in 
management; health, protection, and safety 
at the workplace; and protection of chil- 
dren, adolescents, the elderly, and disabled 
persons. The draft action program that was 
intended to be used to develop realistic 
objectives in respect to the matters in the 
Charter contains 49 different proposals, 34 
of which had been adopted by the Council 
of Ministers as of January 1994. 
Progress on issues addressed by the So- 
cial Charter has been mixed. Notable suc- 
cesses include the directive on harmoniza- 
tion of national regulations on collective 
redundancies (providing for information 
and consultation with workers' representa- 
tives in cases of mass layoffs), the directive 
covering the rights of workers in cases of 
mergers and firm insolvency, various direc- 
tives on gender equality, and a series of 
directives on health and safety issues. On a 
number of other matters, however, the EU 
countries have failed to reach agreement. 
These include worker rights to informa- 
2See Addison and Siebert (1991, 1994), Silvia 
(1991), and Turner (1993) for a detailed account of 
this debate. 
tion, consultation, and participation; pa- 
rental leave; equality between part-time and 
full-time workers; collective bargaining 
rights; and social protection benefits, in- 
cluding health care. 
The various EU actors (governments, 
employers [UNICE], and unions [ETUC]) 
have different positions on these issues, 
and many of the arguments underlying the 
different positions reflect the competitive 
interests of the actors. We now briefly 
examine these various interests and posi- 
tions, both to get a sense of how the differ- 
ent parties regard the role of labor policies 
in determining their competitiveness and 
to evaluate the extent to which these inter- 
ests are overlapping-and therefore the 
extent to which standards are likely to be 
harmonized. 
All the trade union bodies that make up 
the ETUC are in general agreement with 
the Social Charter (although some feel it 
does not go far enough). Streeck (1991) 
analyzed the uneasy alliance between north- 
ern European unions and southern Euro- 
pean interests that led to support by the 
former for the Union's regional aid pro- 
gram, which will transfer funds for develop- 
ment to the less-developed countries, and 
support by the latter for the social initia- 
tives that are aimed at equalizing labor 
standards across the EU. He notes, how- 
ever, that "whether or not regional assis- 
tance and social policies can be properly 
balanced and finetuned, so that infra- 
structural investment in the South does not 
result in job loss in the North, and declin- 
ing wage differentials under the Social Di- 
mension do not enhance agglomeration 
[of industrial activities in the North] in 
spite of improvements in Southern infra- 
structure, remains an entirely open ques- 
tion" (Streeck 1991:328). Thus, we empha- 
size that although the unions are united 
behind the Social Charter, this unity is 
based on a potentially unstable balancing 
of competing interests. 
Employers and governments are less 
united than are unions. Employers in high- 
wage countries, notably Germany, Belgium, 
and the Netherlands, are broadly support- 
ive of the Social Charter because it seeks to 
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prevent capital flight from high-wage to 
low-wage countries; the governments of 
these countries fear an erosion of their tax 
bases as a result of enhanced capital mobil- 
ity, and they do not want other countries to 
have the competitive advantage of fewer 
regulations. In particular, Germany and 
Denmark are supportive of matters relat- 
ing to increased worker consultation, in- 
formation sharing, and participation at the 
strategic level, as their industrial relations 
systems currently include such participa- 
tive arrangements. Most of the other Euro- 
pean countries have some lesser form of 
participation,3 and are in general support 
of consultation rights (Turner 1993). Brit- 
ain and Ireland, the two countries without 
any significant form of worker participa- 
tion, see the introduction of these mea- 
sures as likely to render the Union, and 
their positions within it, less competitive 
(relative to the rest of the world). 
Debates over other issues in the Charter 
reflect further differences in interests, 
which are likely to lead to variance in the 
mechanisms by which decisions are taken. 
One indication of such variance came at 
the summit in Maastricht in the Nether- 
lands on December 10 and 11, 1991, when 
the countries decided that proposals re- 
garding working conditions, information, 
and worker consultation will be decided by 
qualified majority voting (the larger coun- 
tries have more votes than the smaller coun- 
tries, and a qualified majority is defined as 
56 out of 76 votes), whereas laws on rights 
of workers who are terminated, social pro- 
tection, and third country nationals will 
have to be decided by unanimous vote. 
Issues concerning collective bargaining, 
strikes, and union recognition are likely to 
be resolved based on the principle of 
"subsidiarity" (that is, left entirely within 
the purview of individual countries) .4 More- 
over, Britain has been given the freedom to 
3Ten out of the 12 countries have some form of 
works councils, for example. 
4This situation could change, however, given cur- 
rent discussions among the 12 existing EU countries; 
and changes in rules may be made once the four new 
member countries enter in 1995. 
"opt out" of the Charter for the time being, 
with the option of "opting in" if it is willing 
to do so at a later date. 
Thus, given that subsidiarity is the prin- 
ciple that is likely to be used for matters on 
which the parties do not reach agreement, 
and given that the idea of "opting out" 
might gain wider acceptance (for example, 
Danish voters ratified the Maastricht Treaty 
in May 1993 with the provision that Den- 
mark could "opt out" of many specific parts 
of it), it is likely that there will be persistent 
differences in labor standards across the 
EU countries that could affect their com- 
petitive positions. Furthermore, mandat- 
ing the equalization of certain high-cost 
benefits (for example, parental leave and 
employer-funded health care), even if it 
were politically possible, almost certainly 
would not equalize total compensation costs 
in the Union, given the wide variance in 
wages and other employer payments in the 
EU today.5 
Compensation costs alone, however, do 
not determine international competitive- 
ness. As Mosely (1990) and Lange (1992) 
have pointed out, high-wage countries are 
likely to have compensating advantages over 
low-wage countries, such as a more skilled 
work force, better infrastructure, and, per- 
haps, labor productivity that is high enough 
to offset the disadvantages of higher com- 
pensation costs.6 In this paper we ask, first, 
5As noted in the introduction, in 1992, total 
hourly compensation costs to employers in all of 
manufacturing ranged from a high of $25.94 in 
Germany to a low of $5.01 in Portugal, in U.S. 
dollars at current exchange rates. (U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, "International Comparisons of 
Hourly Compensation Costs for Workers in Manu- 
facturing. ") 
6Lange (1992:253), for example, argues that 
despite differences in the social costs for produc- 
ers across member states, the competitiveness of 
similar products produced in different countries 
in the Community often does not greatly vary. The 
reason seems to be that firms in these countries 
establish different mixes among infrastructure, 
skills, training, and technology that allow them to 
remain competitive. No clear cross-national disad- 
vantages for the higher labor and social cost coun- 
tries are evident. 
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how close are manufacturing compensa- 
tion costs and labor productivities across 
the twelve countries, and, second, what 
does that relationship imply for the likeli- 
hood of social dumping? 
Hourly Compensation, 
Productivity, and Unit Labor Costs 
Data and Methods 
We obtained compensation cost data 
from an unpublished source used by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics: "Hourly Com- 
pensation Costs for Production Workers in 
Manufacturing, 33 Countries."7 The BLS 
defines hourly compensation as 
(1) all payments made directly to the worker- 
pay for time worked (basic time and piece rates 
plus overtime premiums, shift differentials, 
other bonuses and premiums paid regularly 
each pay period, and cost-of-living adjustments), 
pay for time not worked (vacations, holidays 
and other leave), all bonuses and other special 
payments, and the cost of payments in kind- 
before payroll deductions of any kind and (2) 
employer contributions to legally required in- 
surance programs and contractual and private 
benefit plans. Hourly compensation costs do 
not include all items of labor costs: the costs of 
recruitment, employee training, and plant fa- 
cilities and services-such as cafeterias and 
medical clinics-are not covered because data 
are not available for most countries. The labor 
costs not covered account for no more than 4% 
of total labor costs in any country for which the 
data are available.8 
Since these data measure the cost to the 
employer of both wages and fringe ben- 
efits, they are clearly relevant to an investi- 
gation of the likelihood of social dumping. 
Moreover, the distinction between wages 
and fringes, on the one hand, and earnings 
per hour, on the other, does matter: Table 
1 gives the percentage difference in 1977 
and 1990 between hourly compensation in 
manufacturing, as defined by the BLS, and 
7Sources for all of the data are cited in the appen- 
dix. 
8U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "International 
Comparisons of Hourly Compensation Costs for Work- 
ers in Manufacturing," Appendix. 
earnings per hour in manufacturing as de- 
fined by the ILO-"cash payments received 
from employers, including remuneration 
for normal working hours; overtime pay; 
remuneration for time notworked; bonuses 
and gratuities; cost of living allowances; 
and special premiums."9 In 1990, this dif- 
ference between earnings and total cost to 
the employer ranged from 16.1 % in Den- 
mark to 84.4% in Belgium; note as well that 
between 1977 and 1990 it rose in every 
country except Italy and Spain. 
Throughout our analysis, we present com- 
pensation results deflated both at market 
exchange rates and at purchasing power 
parity (PPP) exchange rates for GDP. Be- 
cause we are attempting to assess employer 
incentives or, more precisely, capitalist in- 
centives in a world of highly mobile capital, 
market exchange rates might seem at first 
blush to be the more appropriate mea- 
sure.'0 Because we want to take some ac- 
count of the volatility of market exchange 
rates, we present the PPP results as well, but 
we prefer to interpret them in this context 
(that is, when used to deflate compensa- 
tion costs) as representing estimates of long- 
range labor costs for extended investment 
projects, rather than purchasing power; 
presumably, a German employer does not 
care as much about the living standards of 
his or her Portuguese workers as about 
what his or her labor costs will be in a few 
years. 
With respect to productivity, our pri- 
mary goal is to address the policy question 
of whether an economic incentive for capi- 
tal mobility within the EU exists; we do not 
propose any new methodologies for ad- 
dressing the thorny and long-debated prob- 
lem of how to measure productivity across 
countries. We follow the methodology of 
one of the most recent attempts to tackle 
this issue-Hooper and Larin (1989), who 
9ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics. 
'0PPP exchange rates would certainly be more 
appropriate for the analysis of workerincentives-that 
is, the question of differences in living standards 
obtainable from the wages paid across different coun- 
tries. See Flanagan (1993) for an analysis of wage 
equalization and migration flows in the EU since the 
Treaty of Rome. 
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calculate productivity and unit labor costs 
for ten countries, including six of the more- 
developed EU countries-and we refer the 
reader to that paper for a full accounting of 
the methods. " Below, however, we de- 
scribe the basic conceptual issue. 
"Labor productivity," defined in this in- 
stance as GDP in manufacturing divided by 
total hours in manufacturing, must be con- 
verted to some kind of common currency 
to allow comparisons across countries. 
Market exchange rates, however, tend to 
introduce distortions. The United Nations 
has been working on this problem over the 
past few decades with its "International 
Comparison Project"; the result of this 
Project has been the calculation of Pur- 
chasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rates, 
which come closer than market exchange 
rates to allowing a comparison of the "true 
value" of output across countries. PPP 
exchange rates are available through the 
late 1980s for total GDP, but this total GDP 
PPP may be an inappropriate measure when 
applied to manufacturing alone; it is better 
to weight individual output category PPPs 
used in manufacturing by their expendi- 
ture weights. 2 Following Hooper and Larin, 
we use the expenditure weights in the fol- 
lowing sectors to calculate our expendi- 
ture-weighted PPPs: Food, Beverages, and 
Tobacco; Clothing and Footwear; Fuel and 
Power; House Furnishings; Pharmaceuti- 
cal-Therapeutical Health Care; Transport/ 
Communications; Recreation Equipment; 
and Consumer Durables. The measure 
thus derived is still far from perfect, but 
gets us closer to a "true" PPP for manufac- 
turing alone. This approach has one major 
limitation, however: the expenditure 
weights are at present available only for 
1980.'" Thus, to get a sense of the range of 
"We also refer the reader to that paper's technical 
references. Two more recent technical contributions 
are Turvey (1990), which discusses the measurement 
of labor productivity, and Summers and Heston 
(1988), which discusses recent developments in the 
World Comparisons Project. 
120f course, output weights would be even better 
than expenditure weights, but they are not available. 
"3We emphasize that even this approach to mea- 
suring levels of labor productivity and unit labor costs 
Table 1. Manufacturing Compensation 
Costs Compared to Earnings per Hour 
(Percentage Differential), 1977 and 1990, 
European Union Countries. 
Country 1977 1990 
Belgium 70.1 84.4 
Denmark 6.9 16.1 
France 64.0 82.7 
Germany 63.8 71.6 
Greece 56.3 60.8 
Ireland 20.1 29.0 
Italy 68.4 47.9 
Luxembourg 39.3 39.9 
Netherlands 66.4 79.7 
Portugal 26.3 27.3 
Spain 58.3 31.2 
United Kingdom 15.5 20.0 
aFor Italy, 1985; for Portugal, 1988. 
For definitions of hourly compensation and earn- 
ings per hour, see text. 
Source: U.S. BLS, "Hourly Compensation Costs for 
Production Workers in Manufacturing," and ILO Year- 
book of Labor Statistics (earnings per hour in manufac- 
turing). 
possible estimates, we will do our produc- 
tivity calculations using not only this con- 
version factor but also market exchange 
rates and unweighted GDP PPP exchange 
rates, both of which are available for later 
years. 
Hooper and Larin's methodology is to 
calculate the unit labor cost (ULC) as the 
ratio between compensation costs converted 
at market exchange rates and output per 
hour in manufacturing converted at expen- 
diture-weighted PPPs. The possibility we 
investigate in this paper is that producers 
from higher-cost countries "buy labor" by 
converting their own currency to local cur- 
rency at market exchange rates and paying 
the local compensation costs, and then 
transport the product across borders in the 
tariff-free Europe of post-1992; thus, we 
want to translate compensation costs (nu- 
merator) at market exchange rates, but 
is a crude one. It is important to keep in mind that we 
are measuring average rather than marginal labor 
productivity here; given the right data, we would take 
into account the size and quality of the capital stock 
as well. 
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Table 2. Variance of Log Hourly Compensation and Maximum/Minimum Ratios 
by Industry in the European Union, 1977 and 1987. 
Variance of Logs Max/Min 
Industry Year M PPP M PPP Countries 
All Manufacturing 1977 .316 .129 5.25 2.73 Belgium Portugal 
1987 .319 .123 6.71 3.17 Germany Portugal 
Food, Beverages, 1977 .334 .140 5.48 2.96 Denmark Portugal 
Tobacco 1987 .369 .144 7.18 3.65 Netherlands Portugal 
Textile Mill Products 1977 .310 .123 5.73 2.82 Netherlands Portugal 
1987 .323 .116 6.54 3.32 Netherlands Portugal 
Apparel 1977 .334 .142 5.16 2.91 Denmark Portugal 
1987 .335 .128 6.22 2.98 Denmark Portugal 
Lumber, Wood, 1977 .374 .137 6.75 3.27 Belgium Portugal 
Furniture 1987 .407 .178 8.53 4.03 Germany Portugal 
Printing and Publishing 1977 .323 .128 5.96 3.03 Belgium Portugal 
1987 .410 .168 7.46 3.57 Denmark Portugal 
Chemicals 1977 .317 .136 5.19 3.09 Belgium Portugal 
1987 .274 .096 4.83 2.56 Germany Portugal 
Rubber and Plastics 1977 .272 .113 4.44 3.03 Belgium Portugal 
1987 .304 .108 5.54 2.80 Germany Portugal 
Stone, Clay, and Glass 1977 .290 .104 5.23 2.48 Belgium Portugal 
1987 .317 .109 5.97 3.16 Belgium Portugal 
Primary Metal 1977 .250 .085 5.00 2.34 Belgium Portugal 
Manufacturing 1987 .238 .085 5.41 2.79 Germany Portugal 
Fabricated Metal 1977 .285 .113 4.95 2.62 Belgium Portugal 
Products 1987 .303 .111 5.96 3.10 Belgium Portugal 
Machinery, Except 1977 .311 .136 4.91 3.05 Belgium Portugal 
Electrical 1987 .303 .113 5.86 2.77 Germany Portugal 
Electric and Electronic 1977 .274 .118 4.26 2.74 Belgium Portugal 
Equipment 1987 .255 .090 4.51 2.42 Germany Portugal 
Transportation 1977 .214 .075 3.76 2.52 Germany Portugal 
Equipment 1987 .254 .084 5.84 2.76 Germany Portugal 
Notes: M = converted at market exchange rates; PPP converted at unweighted GDP PPP exchange rates; 
Max/Min = ratio of compensation in highest-cost country to compensation in lowest-cost country. Maximum/ 
minimum countries listed are based on market exchange rates. 
Source: U.S. BLS, "Hourly Compensation Costs for Production Workers in Manufacturing." 
because we want to get some measure of the 
"innate value" of the product produced, we 
use weighted PPP exchange rates to con- 
vert the output measure (the denomina- 
tor). ULC can then be interpreted as the 
labor cost per unit of output, or labor costs 
controlling for labor productivity. We also 
report ULCs where the numerator and de- 
nominator are converted by the same ex- 
change rate, again to give some sense of the 
range of possible values. 
Results 
Table 2 presents two measures of the 
inequality of compensation costs in the EU 
in 1977 and 1987, for all of manufacturing 
and for thirteen specific manufacturing 
industries, using both market and 
unweighted GDP PPP exchange rates: the 
variance of log compensation costs across 
the twelve countries, and the ratio between 
the costs of highest- and lowest-cost coun- 
tries. Note that both measures of inequal- 
ity tend to be higher under market ex- 
change rates than under PPP exchange 
rates; the maximum/minimum ratio for 
1977 ranges from 3.76 in transportation 
equipment to 6.75 in lumber, wood, and 
furniture when market exchange rates are 
used as the conversion factor, and from 
2.34 in primary metals to 3.27 in lumber, 
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Table 3. Output per Hour in Manufacturing, 1980 and 1986. 
Output Output Output Output Output 
per Hour per Hour per Hour per Hour per Hour 
U.S. $, Market U.S. $, PPP U.S. $, Expend. U.S. $, Market U.S. $, PPP 
E+-xch. Rates Exch. Rates Weight PPP Exch. Rates Exch. Rates 
Country 1980 1980 1980 1986 1986 
Belgium 22.97 16.52 15.94 24.65 26.72 
Denmark 16.67 11.01 9.96 17.82 15.15 
France 17.38 13.01 11.46 21.34 21.67 
Germany 16.67 12.20 11.00 19.55 19.11 
Greece 7.88 8.04 6.33 7.57 11.54 
Ireland" 8.35 7.22 6.07 
Italy 14.25 14.75 11.85 19.32 22.40 
Luxembourg 17.30 12.84 12.20 20.55 22.22 
Netherlands 17.07 12.32 12.19 21.30 21.55 
Portugal 4.78 7.58 5.05 5.82 11.53 
Spain 11.61 11.74 11.12 16.14 22.68 
United Kingdom 9.43 7.85 6.51 11.45 14.14 
aThe last available output data for Ireland were for 1979. 
Sources: GDP in manufacturing and number of employees from OECD National Accounts, Main Aggregates 
(except for Spain, for which GDP is from the World Bank World Tables); hours per week in manufacturing from 
ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics; vacation and holiday weeks per year from European Trade Union Institute. 
wood, and furniture when PPP exchange 
rates are used. Some other industries with 
large compensation cost gaps are printing 
and publishing, textile mill products, food, 
and stone, clay, and glass; among those 
with the lowest gaps are the heavier indus- 
tries of electronic equipment, rubber and 
plastics, non-electrical machinery, and fab- 
ricated metal products. Note as well that, at 
market exchange rates, the maximum/ 
minimum ratio is higher in 1987 than in 
1977 in all but one industry (chemicals), 
and the variance is higher in all but four 
industries, whereas at PPP exchange rates, 
the maximum/minimum ratio is lower in 
1987 in four of the industries and the vari- 
ance is lower in seven of the industries.'4 
Nevertheless, this table suggests three con- 
clusions, to which we will return: there 
were large differences in compensation 
14Flanagan (1993) found that Germany and Portu- 
gal had similar wage gaps at market exchange rates 
for all of manufacturing in 1988; surprisingly (consid- 
ering the presumably higher cost of living masked by 
market exchange rates in Germany), he found a larger 
gap for PPP exchange rates than for market exchange 
rates. He did not provide these comparisons for the 
disaggregated manufacturing industries reported 
here. 
costs across these countries, the size of 
these gaps varied by industry, and there was 
no significant narrowing of these gaps over 
the 1980s. 
Of course, hourly compensation alone is 
not the entire story; ideally, our analysis 
would control for productivity as well. If 
the lower hourly compensation costs in the 
less-developed countries are matched by 
proportionally lower productivity levels, 
there is no economic incentive for social 
dumping. To address this issue, we calcu- 
late rough measures of unit labor costs 
(ULCs). 
Table 3 presents labor productivity esti- 
mates in manufacturing for 1980 and 1986 
using the three types of conversion factors 
discussed above (market exchange rates, 
unweighted GDP PPPs, and expenditure- 
weighted PPPs). The table shows that the 
EU countries do indeed differ in labor 
productivity.'5 Furthermore, within the 
same country, different values result from 
the use of different conversion factors; par- 
'5The estimate for Spain appears to be unreason- 
ably large; note that Spain is the one country for 
which we needed to use a separate data source from 
the National Accounts (see the notes to Table 3). 
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ticularly striking are differences between 
the results based on market exchange rates 
and PPPs. The productivity gaps between 
the less-developed and more-developed 
countries are greater when converted at 
market exchange rates. The expenditure 
weighting also seems to make a difference, 
particularly in Portugal, Italy, Greece, and 
Ireland, perhaps reflecting different bal- 
ances of manufacturing in total GDP. Note 
that productivity grew in all of these coun- 
tries between 1980 and 1986, but not at the 
same rate; we will discuss productivity 
growth rates below. 
The first column of Table 4 reports aver- 
age manufacturing hourly compensation 
levels in dollars (at market exchange rates) 
in the twelve countries and the ranking of 
those countries in terms of this measure in 
1980 and 1986. In 1980, the five countries 
with the least expensive compensation costs, 
in ascending order of cost, were Portugal, 
Greece, Spain, Ireland, and the United 
Kingdom; Germany, the BeNeLux coun- 
tries, and Denmark had the highest com- 
pensation costs. 
The remaining columns of Table 4 
present our three measures of manufactur- 
ing ULCs. The first (Method A) can be 
thought of as converting both the numera- 
tor and denominator at the same conver- 
sion factor (market exchange rates or PPPs); 
the second (Method B) converts the nu- 
merator at market exchange rates and the 
denominator at unweighted GDP PPPs; and 
the third (Method C) converts the numera- 
tor at market exchange rates and the de- 
nominator at expenditure-weighted PPPs. 16 
Note that the ranking of the countries in 
terms of hourly compensation does not 
precisely coincide with the ranking in terms 
'6Hooper and Larin (1989) used GDP data from 
the U.S. BLS, which is not available for the six EU 
countries they do not analyze; for all the countries but 
Spain, we use National Accounts estimates, which 
differ somewhat from the BLS estimates. This differ- 
ence in sources most likely explains the deviations 
from the Hooper and Larin ULC estimates reported 
in the note to the table. Note, however, that devia- 
tions of our ULC estimates from the Hooper and 
Larin estimates are all within 18%. Recall that the 
expenditure weights are only available for 1980. 
of unit labor costs. For example, Belgium 
had the highest hourly compensation in 
1980 but only the seventh-highest ULC due 
to high labor productivity, whereas the 
United Kingdom had the eighth-highest 
hourly compensation but the highest ULC 
(using expenditure-weighted PPP exchange 
rates in the denominator-Method C) due 
to low labor productivity, as measured here. 
It is clear, then, that average labor produc- 
tivity is not directly proportional to com- 
pensation. 
In terms of the comparative magnitudes 
of the ULCs, the main finding is that labor 
productivity in manufacturing was between 
3.5 times (at market exchange rates) and 
1.6 times (at GDP PPPs) as large in Ger- 
many as in Portugal in 1980, while hourly 
compensation costs were between 6 and 3 
times larger, yielding unit labor costs be- 
tween 1.7 and 3.7 times larger in Germany 
than in Portugal. The Greek and Spanish 
ULCs were also low (about one-half of the 
German ULC, at expenditure-weighted 
PPPs). 
We cannot be confident about the pre- 
cise magnitudes of these unit labor cost 
measures, but lacking a systematic bias lead- 
ing to gross overestimation of labor pro- 
ductivity in Portugal, Greece, and Spain 
compared to Germany, it does look as 
though unit labor costs were lower in those 
countries than in Germany. In fact, if any- 
thing, we might expect the bias to go in the 
opposite direction: marginal labor pro- 
ductivity (or perhaps even "potential pro- 
ductivity") should be underestimated by 
average productivity in less-developed coun- 
tries compared to more-developed coun- 
tries, given the larger and more advanced 
capital stocks in the more-developed coun- 
tries. 
In sum, our analysis of levels of manufac- 
turing unit labor costs in 1980 indicates 
that the dramatic compensation differen- 
tials across the countries are not entirely 
offset by labor productivity differentials. 
The last two columns of Table 4 measures 
unit labor costs in 1986 (the last year for 
which all the data are available): note that 
while ULCs dropped everywhere over the 
period 1980-86 (indicating faster growth 
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Table 5. Growth Rate of Real Manufacturing 
Hourly Compensation in the European 
Union, 1980-1989. 
Annualized Annualized 
Real Comp. Real Comp. 
Growth., '80-'89 Growth, '80-'89 
Own Country Real DM 
Currency & Current 
Country Prices Exch. Rates 
Belgium .57 -.66 
Denmark .50 1.34 
France 2.03 1.56 
Germany 1.65 1.65 
Greece 2.88 2.13 
Ireland 1.94 3.30 
I taly .75 3.79 
Luxembourg' .07 -1.27 
Netherlands 1.30 .36 
Portugal -.61 1.11 
Spain 1.33 2.72 
United Kingdom 1.68 1.50 
Figures for Luxembourg are for 1988. 
Sources: Hourly Compensation from U.S. BLS; 
price indexes and exchange rates from OECD Na- 
tional Accounts, Main Aggregates Vol.1, 1960-1989. 
in productivity than in compensation), they 
fell slightly more in percentage terms in 
the less-developed countries (Portugal and 
Spain in particular) than in some of the 
more-developed countries (Germany and 
Denmark): for example, the ULC gap be- 
tween Germany and Portugal rose to be- 
tween 1.9 times and 3.9 times (converting 
the denominator at market and unweighted 
GDP PPP exchange rates, respectively). We 
next examine this apparent lack of conver- 
gence in more detail. 
Trends in Manufacturing 
Compensation Costs 
Our goal in this section and the next is to 
examine movements of hourly compensa- 
tion and productivity in the EU countries 
over the 1980s to get a sense of whether the 
components of ULC have been converg- 
ing. 
First, we examine whether hourly com- 
pensation costs in manufacturing across 
the twelve countries are converging. The 
answer to that question not only will tell us 
about movements in the numerator of the 
ULC formula, but is also interesting in it- 
self.17 Table 5 shows annual growth rates of 
real manufacturing compensation costs 
over the 1980s in the twelve countries at 
own-country prices (column one) and at 
common currency and prices in German 
Deutschmarks (column two). Note that 
exchange rate movements introduce dis- 
tortions; from the perspective of the Ger- 
man investor, the growth rate of compensa- 
tion costs at German prices and market 
exchange rates is relevant to the question 
of whether he or she should invest, whereas 
from the perspective of the Portuguese 
worker, the growth rate in his or her own 
currency at Portuguese prices is relevant to 
that worker's personal well-being. For the 
social dumping question, we must focus on 
the perspective of an outside investor; we 
choose Germany for obvious reasons. 
The table does not indicate a high de- 
gree of convergence, particularly when 
Germany, Denmark, and the United King- 
17Leamer (1993:67) used a different data set to 
examine convergence of industrial wages in the EU, 
among other groups of countries. He concluded that 
"a considerable amount of wage equalization occurred 
between 1978 and 1989 [within the EU]." In contrast 
in his analysis of wage dispersion among the original 
EC6 and the EC9, Flanagan (1993:174), who exam- 
ined some of the same data we do, found that 
the dispersion of labor costs and wages eventually 
falls dramatically in the late 1970s, only to rise again 
in the last half of the 1980s. By the end of the period 
(1989), the dispersion of hourly labor costs in manu- 
facturing among the original EC6 is only slightly 
below dispersion in 1960. The same is true of the data 
for the EC9.... Much the same may be said of the 
Swedish Employers' Confederation measures of hourly 
wages in manufacturing and construction. 
Van Mourik[1989:101] found that 
using a very straight-forward neoclassical model of 
international trade, from which the assumption of 
identical production functions among countries has 
been dropped, we were able to show that wage differ- 
entials [within the EU] may be the result of different 
factor proportions as well as different elasticities of 
substitution and different overall rates and biases of 
technological progress. The paramneter estimates 
have revealed that the empirical values of the elastic- 
ity of substitution favor wage convergence, but that 
the movement is counteracted by the va-ious valLes of 
labor's share in national income. 
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dom are compared to Portugal, Greece, 
and Spain. Recall as well that neither the 
variance of log wages nor the maximum/ 
minimum ratio for all of manufacturing 
dropped between 1977 and 1987 (except 
for a slight drop of the variance at PPP 
exchange rates; see Table 2).18 
Trends in Productivity and 
Unit Labor Costs 
Now consider Table 6, which shows the 
growth rate of manufacturing productivity 
(both in output per employee and in out- 
put per hour) over the 1980s in eleven of 
the twelve countries. 
The first column of Table 6 indicates 
that productivity growth (measured in terms 
of real output per employee) from 1980 to 
1987 was three times higher in Portugal 
and Spain than in Germany, and also some- 
what higher in Greece than in Germany.'9 
In conjunction with the compensation 
growth rates reported in Table 5 and the 
ULC results for 1986 reported in Table 4, 
this result seems to indicate that from the 
perspective of a German investor, unit la- 
bor costs are not significantly converging. 
Note, in particular, that the growth rate of 
hourly compensation in German currency 
over the period 1980-89 was actually less 
for Portugal than for Germany or Den- 
mark, and higher overall, but not higher 
than the output-per-employee growth rate 
differential, in Spain than in Germany or 
Denmark (see Table 5). Only in the 
BeNeLux countries (because of low com- 
pensation cost growth in those countries) 
and the United Kingdom (because of high 
productivity growth) do ULCs appear to 
have been converging with ULCs in less- 
developed countries. In sum, it does not 
look as though the more-developed and 
less-developed countries (or, at least, Ger- 
'8Flanagan (1993) found somewhat more conver- 
gence among the EC-6 and EC-9 countries, but also 
found an increase in dispersion in the late 1980s. 
"9The results for the growth rate of output per 
hour are more mixed. Note, however, the differences 
in periods imposed by data limitations, explained in 
the note to Table 6. 
Table 6. Growth Rate of Manufacturing 
Productivity in the European Union 
in the 1980s. 
Annualized Annualized 
Growth of Growth of 
Real Output Real Output 
per Employee per Hour 
Country 1 980-1 987 1980-1989a 
Belgium 4.01 6.17 
Denmark .22 .40 
France 2.57 3.83 
Germany 1.07 1.94 
Greece 1.21 -.30 
Ireland 
Italy 4.96 5.41 
Luxembourg 2.96 5.48 
Netherlands 4.60 4.36 
Portugal 4.09 1.68 
Spain 3.36 3.17 
United Kingdom 5.54 6.37 
aYears for growth rate of output/hour: Belgium, 
'80-'88; Greece, '81-'88; Luxembourg, '80-'88; Neth- 
erlands, '80-'87; Portugal, '80-'86; Spain, '86-'89; 
United Kingdom, '80-'86. 
Sources: Output/Employee index from World Bank 
World Tables; GDP, price indexes, and employees from 
OECD National Accounts, Main Aggregates (except 
Greece Employment, which is from ILO Yearbook of 
Labour Statistics); hours per week in manufacturing 
from ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics; vacation and 
holiday weeks per year from European Trade Union 
Institute. 
many and Denmark compared to Spain 
and Portugal) were significantly converg- 
ing in ULCs as the year 1992 approached. 
Even if our measures of productivity 
growth are inexact (given our data limita- 
tions on output per hour and the inherent 
problems with attempting to measure pro- 
ductivity), keep in mind that the numbers 
on hourly compensation growth rate are 
probably more reliable, and that we may be 
able to draw inferences about the growth of 
ULCs from those numbers alone. That is, if 
productivity convergence is occurring in 
the classical sense (less-developed coun- 
tries catching up with more-developed couIn- 
tries),20 then the fact that hourly compen- 
20For a recent test of this convergence hypothesis, 
which finds convergence among the world's most 
industrialized countries as well as among countries 
with above-average literacy rates, see Zagardo (1991). 
 at CORNELL UNIV on January 26, 2016ilr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
40 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW 
sation is not growing much faster in the 
less-developed countries (particularly Por- 
tugal and Greece) than in the more-devel- 
oped countries indicates that ULCs may be 
growing farther apart. 
This analysis of the compensation and 
productivity structures of the EU countries 
suggests two basic conclusions. First, pro- 
ductivity differences do not appear to ac- 
count for all of the big compensation dif- 
ferentials between the more-developed and 
less-developed EU countries; the economic 
incentive for moving production to lower- 
cost countries does seem to be present at 
this aggregate level of analysis. Second, in 
terms of relative magnitudes of unit labor 
costs, the countries were not significantly 
converging as they approached the single 
market. 
Evidence on Foreign 
Direct Investment in the EU 
The question at hand is whether, with 
the removal of most barriers to trade and 
capital mobility within the EU, producers 
in high-cost countries will move their op- 
erations to low-cost regions. Until an EU 
directive of July 1, 1990, regulation of in- 
ward foreign direct investment (FDI) was 
primarily controlled by individual member 
governments.2 The directive essentially 
abolished all barriers to the free movement 
of capital within EU member states, al- 
though some capital controls will remain in 
place in Greece and Portugal until 1995. In 
addition, the Council Regulation on the 
Control of Concentrations Between Un- 
dertakings adopted in 1989 regulates merg- 
ers, takeovers, and acquisitions within or 
outside the EU. The United Nations 
(1993:11) reported that the most signifi- 
cant changes within the Union affecting 
inward investment during the late 1980s 
took place in France, Spain, Portugal, Den- 
mark, Greece, and Ireland. 
21lnward FDI refers to FDI entering a country; 
outward FDI refers to FDI exiting a country. We 
adopt this terminology from the United Nations 
(1993). 
Moreover, unlike the situation in North 
America, where many argued that U.S. capi- 
tal was free to locate in Mexico with or 
without NAFTA, much of the single market 
legislation in the EU has involved removing 
substantial indirect barriers to the move- 
ment of capital. Three primary types of 
impediments to the production and move- 
ment of goods have discouraged the free 
movement of capital: physical barriers (for 
example, costs of customs duties, tariffs, 
and delays on the re-importing of final 
products), technical barriers (for example, 
different standards for individual products 
adopted in different states for health, safety, 
environmental, or consumer protection, 
and rules regarding public procurement), 
and fiscal barriers (for example, VAT taxes, 
differential excise duties, and other indi- 
rect taxes) 22 These are the types of barriers 
that the internal market program was de- 
signed to eliminate. 
Although these controls were still being 
dismantled during the 1980s, intra-EU FDI 
increased from one-quarter of the total 
inward stock in the EU in 1980 to 40% in 
1990, when it reached a level of approxi- 
mately $280 billion (United Nations 
1993:31). At least three caveats must be 
borne in mind, however, in considering 
these figures: (1) investment before De- 
cember 31, 1992, reflected whatever was 
happening because of (or in spite of) barri- 
ers that were removed for intra-EU transac- 
tions after 1992; (2) the terms of the Social 
Charter, and therefore the cost of investing 
in the less-developed countries after 1992, 
have been subject to considerable uncer- 
tainty for potential investors and others; 
and (3) non-European countries may have 
invested heavily in certain EU countries 
during the 1980s in order to gain a foot- 
hold before the end of 1992. We now 
present an exploratory analysis of FDI flows 
to EU countries during the 1980s to get a 
sense of the responsiveness of FDI to labor 
costs prior to the single market, keeping in 
mind these caveats. Due to data limita- 
22See Cecchini (1988) and Commission of the 
European Communities (1988) for further analysis of 
these issues. 
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tions, we will confine our analysis to aggre- 
gate FDI activity in each of the countries 
during the period 1980-88. 
It is notoriously difficult o find reliable 
measures of FDI;23 we report here some 
data from a recent U.N. attempt to fill this 
gap. Table 7 shows the stock of inward FDI 
for the EU countries in 1979 (column one), 
as well as the aggregate flow of inward FDI 
and the balance of FDI flows (inward flow 
minus outward flow, or net flow) over the 
period 1980-88 (columns 2 and 3), all in 
1982 U.S. dollars. Note that the inflow of 
foreign direct investment during the 1980s 
was larger than the total stock of inward 
foreign direct investment in 1979 in all of 
the countries except Denmark, Germany, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom, indicating that the flow of FDI 
into the less-developed EU countries in 
particular during the 1980s was large com- 
pared to past experience (see the first two 
columns) .24 
23The United Nations (1993:v) notes that "despite 
the increasing importance of foreign direct invest- 
ment in the world economy, published sources or 
readily accessible databases that provide homoge- 
neous and accurate data on the investments and 
other activities of transnational corporations are 
scarce." Molle (1990) attempted to analyze flows of 
FDI in the EU from sources of FDI that were available 
at the time of his writing, with the caveat that "be- 
cause, on the whole, inward investment is documented 
better than outward investment, the former has been 
taken as the main basis of our calculations.... Conse- 
quently, although [his analysis] gives the best pos- 
sible picture of DI in Europe, the figures.. can only 
be regarded as indications, or as the likely order of 
magnitudes" (p. 245n). He concludes that his figures 
"indicate that there is a net flow of capital towards the 
less developed EU countries; in other words, they 
confirm that jobs are indeed going to the people, 
although formerly people used to go to where the 
jobs were" (p. 235). 
241n addition, within the EU, both national and 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions made by 
Europe's leading 100 firms (which might be thought 
of as camouflaged foreign direct investment) have 
been increasing dramatically, from 303 mergers and 
acquisitions in 1987 to 622 in 1990. The locus of 
cross-border acquisitions is primarily engineering, 
chemicals, electronics, pharmaceuticals, transport, 
and banking. The number of new companies from 
outside the EU establishing a foothold in the EU via 
mergers or acquisitions increased from about 30 in 
1987 to about 125 in 1990. (Data from the Economist, 
December 7-13, 1991, andJuly 4-10, 1992.) 
Table 7. Foreign Direct Investment Stocks 
and Flows in the European Union. 
(Millions of 1982 U.S. Dollars). 
Inward Inward 
FDI FDI FDI 
Stock, Flow, Balance 
Country 1979 1980-88 1980-88 
Belgium/Lux. 9742 13610 6079 
Denmark 5413 1284 -1460 
France 16713 25939 -14043 
Germany 48771 8026 -40319 
Greece 4355 7786 7528 
Ireland 2449 1329 157 
Italy 11181 14873 -2879 
Netherlands 22926 19745 -22647 
Portugal 631 1895 1671 
Spain 6103 23036 19200 
United Kingdom 59052 49790 -67789 
Notes: Belgium and Luxembourg are combined in 
these data. Ireland FDI stock data are from 1981. 
"Inward FDI Stock" means existing stock of FDI from 
other countries; "Inward FDI Flows" means flows of 
FDI from other countries; "FDI Balance" means flows 
of FDI from other countries (inward FDI flows) minus 
flows of FDI to other countries (outward FDI flows). 
Source: United Nations, World Investment Directory 
1992: Developed Countries, Country Tables 2, 6. 
Although these numbers are the result 
of an attempt by the United Nations to 
centralize data-gathering efforts so that 
foreign direct investment could be mea- 
sured systematically, there are nevertheless 
some serious questions about the compara- 
bility of these data across countries.25 Still, 
25As the United Nations (1993:68; the source of 
these data) notes: 
There is a notorious lack of comparability of the FDI 
data of different countries. There are three main 
causes for the lack of comparability and discrepan- 
cies. First, countries differ in their definitions of FDI, 
since most depart in one way or another from the 
conventions recommended by IMF or OECD [that is, 
some countries include all three components of FDI 
(equity capital, reinvested earnings, and intercom- 
pany loans) and some do not]. Second, countries 
differ in their methods of data collection; a principal 
problem is the difficulty of identifying the ultimate 
beneficiary as opposed to the immediate beneficiary 
of FDI. [Other problems are the exclusive use of 
foreign exchange records or regulatory institutions, 
as opposed to company surveys, in some countries, as 
well as differences in industrial coverage and the 
treatment of banks and other financial institutions.] 
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1980 Unit Labor Cost, method C 
Figure 1. Relationship Between 1980 Unit Labor Cost 
and 1980-88 FDI Balance, 11 EU Countries. 
bearing that in mind, we can examine the 
basic relationship between the FDI inflows 
and balances over the course of the 1980s 
presented in Table 7 and the measures of 
1980 compensation and ULCs presented in 
Table 4. Whereas the correlations of the 
1980-88 inward FDI flows with all the mea- 
sures of 1980 compensation and unit labor 
costs are positive and below 0.5, the corre- 
lation of 1980-88 balances of FDI flows 
with the measures of labor costs in 1980 are 
as follows: compensation, -0.29; unit labor 
cost method A, -0.84; unit labor cost method 
Third, corporate accounting practices and valuation 
methods differ between countries [that is, in the use 
of historical valuation of assets (which disregards the 
effects of inflation, for example), methods of con soli- 
dation, and the treatment of capital gains and losses]. 
B, -0.64; and unit labor cost method C, 
-0.75.26 These correlations suggest that the 
lower labor cost countries received the larg- 
est net flows of FDI during the 1980s; this 
relationship between 1980-88 balance of 
FDI flows and 1980 unit labor cost (method 
C) is graphed in Figure 1. 
2'Although the correlation of FDI balance with 
coinpenisation is iot statistically siginificait at coiveni- 
tional levels, the negative correlations of all three 
measures of unit labor costs with FDI balance are 
significant at the 0.01 level. One ulnit labor cost 
measure is positively and significantly correlated with 
FDI inflows at the 0.10 level; the other measures of 
compensation and uinit labor cost are not statistically 
significantly correlated with FDI inflows. The rank- 
order correlations (a more non-paramnetric measure) 
of compensation and UILCs with FDI balance are 
-0.45, -0.84, -0.70, and -0.78, respectively. 
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Moreover, although two countries with 
relatively high labor costs-Belgium/Lux- 
embourg and Ireland-had a puzzling posi- 
tive FDI flow balance over the years 1980- 
88, the only other countries with positive 
balances of FDI flows over those years were 
the countries with the three lowest unit 
labor costs: Spain, Greece, and Portugal. 
These findings indicate that although some 
of the more-developed, higher-cost coun- 
tries received large inflows of FDI, they also 
had large outflows, so that the balances of 
FDI flows to the EU countries in the 1980s 
nevertheless bore a strong negative rela- 
tionship with labor costs, particularly unit 
labor costs."7 
There are several different types of ap- 
proaches to modeling the determinants of 
FDI inflows: those based on perfect mar- 
kets suggest that differential rates of return 
and risk should be important determinants 
of FDI; those based on market imperfec- 
tions suggest that differential firm advan- 
tages (such as financing or marketing skills) 
are important; those based on propensity 
to invest suggest that factors such as exist- 
ing investment and exchange rates should 
be important; and FDI inflow theories sug- 
gest that factors related to the host country, 
such as tax rates, political stability, and 
labor costs, should be important (Agarwal 
1980). We include three key variables 
from the literature in our analysis: domes- 
tic demand (as measured by GDP), labor 
factors (measured here as labor costs), and 
existing FDI stock.28 We do not propose to 
develop a general theory of the determi- 
nants of FDI here; rather, we want to get a 
27The United Kingdom, for example, while having 
the largest FDI inflow, also had the largest net FDI 
outflow. 
28See, for example, Cushman (1987). We include 
1979 inward FDI stock because existing stock likely 
bears a positive relationship to subsequent flows for 
reasons such as reinvestment of earnings and conta- 
gion effects. We include GDP to control for the size 
of the domestic market. We lack reliable data over 
the course of the decade for all these countries on 
return on FDI, tax rates, political stability, and so on; 
studies using these variables are generally based on 
more limited samples of the developed countries. 
Froot and Stein (1991) found that exchange rates 
basic sense of whether FDI movements were 
responsive to labor cost differentials across 
the European Union countries over the 
1980s.2i) 
Table 8 reports the results of a regres- 
sion in which the dependent variable is the 
logarithm of 1980-88 aggregate real in- 
ward FDI flow for each country (from Table 
7) and the independent variables are the 
logarithms of the various measures of com- 
pensation costs and ULCs in 1980 (from 
Table 4), stock of inward FDI in 1979, and 
aggregate GDP over the period 1980-88. 
The results indicate that, after controlling 
for existing inward FDI stock and GDP, FDI 
inflows during the 1980s bore a strong nega- 
tive relationship to the various measures of 
ULCs in the 1980: in regressions (4), (6), 
and (8), a one-percent difference in the 
various measures of ULC is associated with 
a -2.62% to -4.24% difference in FDI in- 
flow, and the coefficients on the measures 
of ULC are statistically significant at the 
10% level or better.30 
We emphasize that our analysis of for- 
eign direct investment is not complete. For 
example, a thorough analysis of flows of 
foreign direct investment over the 1980s 
would require data that are more complete 
and consistent across countries, as well as a 
model explaining the initial levels and why 
the shares are shifting. One finding that 
may be taken as suggestive, however, is that 
the balance of foreign direct investment 
flows was largest in some of the less-devel- 
oped countries, which is consistent with 
fears regarding social dumping. On the 
other hand, although we find a strong nega- 
tive relationship between 1980 ULCs and 
influenced FDI inflows into the United States, but not 
the inflows into many other countries; although we 
do not include exchange rates separately, we recog- 
nize that the sizes of the labor cost differentials in our 
study are also a function of exchange rate differen- 
tials. 
29Further, we certainly are not claiming that there 
cannot be any excluded variables that are correlated 
with labor costs that might be true causal factors on 
FDI. 
30Regression results based on 1986 compensation 
and labor cost data are qualitatively similar to the 
results reported here based on 1980 labor cost data. 
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Table 8. Determinants of Aggregate 1980-88 Real Inward FDI Flows, European Union Countries. 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1980 0.74 -0.89 
Compensation (0.70) (0.76) 
1980 ULC 0.73 -4.24* 
Method A (2.05) (1.93) 
1980 ULC. 0.53 -2.62 
Method B (0.99) (1.00) 
1980 ULC 0.34 -3.51 
Method C (1.22) (0.92) 
1979 Inward 0.64 1.17i 1.46 " 1. 5 7 -' 
FDI Stock (0.51) (0.53) (0.55) (0.42) 
1980-88 0.39 -0.06 -0.19 -0.28 
Real GDP (0.41) (0.42) (0.40) (0.32) 
R-squared 0.11 0.65 0.01 0.75 0.03 0.79 0.01 0.87 
Notes: Belgium and Luxembourg are combined in these data. Ireland FDI stock data are from 1981. All 
variables are in logarithms. Regressions include a constant (not reported). 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level; ` the 5% level; '**the 1% level. 
inward FDI flows during the 1980s (after 
controlling for the existing stock of inward 
FDI and GDP), the gross inward investment 
flows to the lower-cost countries were not as 
large as the gross inflows to many of the 
higher-cost countries. 
One major question that this analysis 
raises, then, is why we have not yet seen 
massive foreign investment in the less-de- 
veloped countries, given the differences in 
labor costs. Several plausible explanations 
can be offered. The first is that the direct 
and indirect controls on the movement of 
capital that have only recently been re- 
moved were significantly discouraging in- 
vestment. Second, it may be that the level 
of uncertainty regarding the final terms of 
the Social Charter has been high enough to 
induce investors to wait until the issues are 
settled. A third possibility was suggested by 
Streeck (1991), who discussed the transfor- 
mation of the German economy toward a 
high-wage, high-skill, and high-value-added 
production system, with the abandonment 
by employers of the low-wage, low-skill 
model.3' Employers in high-wage countries 
"This consideration is clearly related to the "flex- 
ible specialization" debate; see Piore and Sabel (1984). 
undergoing that kind of change might not 
consider labor costs as an important com- 
ponent of their competitiveness. A fourth 
possibility is that if investors see labor costs 
as a key component of their business strat- 
egy, they may locate production facilities in 
areas outside the EU, such as Eastern Eu- 
rope and Southeast Asia, where labor costs 
are even lower than in the less-developed 
EU countries. Fifth, producers in the high- 
cost countries may have preferred, thus far, 
to use the threat of social dumping as a 
bargaining chip with the unions in their 
home countries, rather than actually mov- 
ing production. 
Finally, even if employers in the more- 
developed countries are interested in pur- 
suing low-wage, low-skill mass production 
in the less-developed countries, there still 
remains the question of whether the level 
of development in the less-developed coun- 
tries, in things ranging from infrastructure 
and communications to education, is high 
enough to allow for any significant amount 
of foreign direct investment-that is, 
whether these countries have the capacity 
to increase their productivity dramatically. 
Table 9 gives the percentage of skilled and 
unskilled workers in industry in 10 of the 
EU countries, as reported by employers in 
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a survey. Not surprisingly, the percentage 
of skilled workers is lowest in Portugal and 
Spain; surprisingly, however, it is not par- 
ticularly low in Greece. In 1981, the illit- 
eracy rate among those 15 years old and 
older was 7.1% in Spain, 9.5% in Greece, 
and 20.6% in Portugal.32 These results 
suggest that the level of development (in 
terms of skill, literacy, and infrastructure) 
in the least-developed EU countries could 
be so low as to provide a disincentive for 
foreign investment, at least until the Union's 
regional aid program begins to have a sub- 
stantial impact on the development of these 
countries. 
Conclusions 
Our objective has been to evaluate the 
importance of unit labor costs-that is, 
worker compensation per unit of output- 
to the capital mobility aspect of the social 
dumping debate in the European Union. 
Our analysis shows that in 1986 there were 
sizable differences across EU countries in 
unit labor costs in manufacturing and that 
these differences did not narrow signifi- 
cantly over the 1980s as the countries ap- 
proached the single market-strongly sug- 
gesting that sizable differences exist today. 
Although we also found that during the 
1980s the differences in compensation lev- 
els varied across industries within manufac- 
turing, it is clear that, in general, the inter- 
country differences in productivity did not 
completely offset the inter-country differ- 
ences in worker compensation, and conse- 
quently there appears to have been a labor 
cost incentive for capital mobility within 
the EU. 
Yet, we also found that over the period 
1980-88 investment flows to the member 
countries with lower unit labor costs were 
not remarkably larger than investment flows 
to the member countries with higher unit 
labor costs. Our findings, together with 
those of Flanagan (1993), thus pose the 
puzzle of why capital and labor flows have 
not yet responded strongly to the large 
32Source: United Nations Statistical Yearbook. 1981 
is the last year for which this measure is available. 
Table 9. Percentage of Skilled and 
Unskilled Workers in Industry 
in the European Union, 1989. 
(Based on Employer Surveys) 
Percentage of Employees Designated( as: 
Country Skilled Unskilled 
Belgium 60 40 
Denmark 
France 77 23 
Germany 61 39 
Greece 72 28 
Ireland 61 39 
I taly 91 9 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 77 23 
Portugal 52 48 
Spain 54 46 
United Kingdom 64 36 
Source: EC ad hoc labor market survey (based on 
25,000 industrial firms and carried out by the na- 
tional institutes that conduct monthly EC business 
surveys), as reported in "Developments on the Labour 
Market in the Community," European Economy, No. 47, 
p. 65. 
differentials in unit labor costs and wages 
that persist within the EU. Flanagan sug- 
gested that internal EU migration failed to 
respond to the large wage differentials 
within the EU and to the lifting of previous 
barriers to labor mobility because "signifi- 
cant nonpecuniary migration costs (par- 
ticularly those associated with language) 
appear to have overwhelmed the potential 
wage benefits from moving between EC 
member countries" (Flanagan 1993:184). 
We have suggested that capital may have 
failed to respond to the large unit labor 
cost differentials because of several factors, 
including barriers to capital mobility that 
have only recently been removed; uncer- 
tainty regarding the final terms of the So- 
cial Charter; the choice by employers in the 
higher-cost countries to pursue high-wage, 
high-skill, and high-value added produc- 
tion systems; the availability of even lower- 
cost production sites outside the EU; and 
the low level of development in the less- 
developed EU countries. 
The policy implications of these findings 
depend on how one interprets the relative 
unresponsiveness of capital flows to labor 
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cost differentials in the EU in recent years. 
On the one hand, it may be argued that 
capital will soon begin flowing at a much 
quicker pace to the lower-cost countries 
now that the barriers to the movement of 
capital and goods have been removed, and 
that the movement of capital will pick up 
even more once the uncertainty about the 
Social Charter has been completely resolved 
and, perhaps, once the regional aid pro- 
gram has significantly increased the level of 
development in the lower-cost countries. If 
one accepts that proposition, then the pri- 
mary implication of this analysis is that the 
Union may have to pursue a policy of fur- 
ther upward harmonization of labor stan- 
dards and perhaps even compensation costs 
in order to offset the current differentials. 
Of course, these actions would require a 
judgment on the part of the Union that the 
advantages of large capital flows to the 
lower labor cost countries (primarily the 
increase in employment and incomes in 
these countries) would be offset completely 
or in large part by the losses (primarily the 
loss of high-paying jobs in the wealthier 
countries). 
Alternatively, the lack of large capital 
flows to the less-developed EU countries as 
of 1988 may be seen as an indication of 
future trends. The availability of even lower 
labor cost opportunities elsewhere in the 
world, in this view, or the adoption of high- 
wage, high-skill production systems by em- 
ployers in the more-developed countries, 
may continue to discourage capital move- 
ment within the EU. In that case, the 
implication is that further upward harmo- 
nization policies may not be necessary. Our 
findings therefore provide mixed signals 
on this important policy question. We have 
focused here on the labor cost incentive for 
capital mobility; a more comprehensive 
answer to the question of social dumping 
will have to take into account other factors 
in the investment location decision, such as 
education and skill levels, infrastructural 
development, land costs, transportation 




Compensation cost data were obtained from an 
unpublished source used by the U.S. Department of 
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics: "Hourly Compen- 
sation Costs for Production Workers in Manufactur- 
ing, 33 Countries." Our output (or value added) 
data, used to calculate productivity and unit labor 
costs, are gross domestic products from the national 
accounts of the various countries, as reported in the 
OECD publication National Accounts 1977-1989, De- 
tailed Tables, Volume II. 
Our data on number of employees are taken from 
the National Accounts, and in a few cases (noted in 
the tables) from the ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics. 
The hours worked per week are from the ILO Year- 
book, and the weeks of vacation and holidays per year 
are from the European Trade Union Institute's Collec- 
tive Bargaining in Western Europe in 1989. 
The purchasing power parity exchange rates and 
GDP expenditure weights are from the publication 
World Comparisons of Purchasing Power and Real Product 
for 1980 from Phase IV of the United Nations World 
Comparisons Project. PPP exchange rates for all of 
GDP are also available from the National Accounts; 
market exchange rates were obtained from the Na- 
tional Accounts and the BLS. 
Finally, we get some of our statistics, such as the 
index of real output per employee for all of the 
countries and GDP in manufacturing for Spain, from 
the World Bank World Tables; again, these cases are 
reported in the footnotes to the tables. 
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